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Abstract  
This paper analyzes a multiperiod delegation model with two principals and an agent. 
The purpose of the model is to explore the determinants of civil service structure, in 
particular, the use of political appointees (short lived agents) vs. civil servants (long lived 
agents). We see this process as a bargaining problem between two principals, Congress, a 
long lived principal, and the President, a short lived one. Our model is consistent with three 
aspects of the U.S. Civil Service: its evolution during this century, the high proportion of 
political appointees in the higher civil service with respect to its counterparts in occidental 
democracies with parliamentary systems, and the different scope of civil service coverage in 
local governments in the United States. We argue that these differences in the organization 
of civil services across countries and over time can be understood as the result of a game 
among multiple principals for the control of the bureaucracy, with the main determinants 
being the extent by which the legislative and executive bodies are aligned in their interests, 
who is politically more powerful, whether they have different political horizons, and to 
what extent political parties control their representatives at both the executive and legisla- 
tive bodies. We model this interaction by letting the principals have different horizons. One 
principal lives through the entire game and faces a series of short lived principals. The 
emphasis of the model is on the choice of the agent, who can be either short or long lived. 
* Corresponding author. 
This paper was initially written while Urbiztondo was a Graduate Student, Department of Economics, 
University of Illinois. We would like to thank Lee Alston, Charlie Kahn, Jim Kukllnski, Peter Nardulli 
and seminar participants at the Instituto Torcuato Di Tella for helpful comments and suggestions. 
0176-2680/94/$07.00 © 1994 Elsevier Science B.V. All fights reserved 
SSDI 0176-2680(94)00034-H 
466 P.T. Spiller, S. Urbiztondo /European Journal of Polit!cal Economy 10 (1994) 465-497 
We analyze the optimal agent type from the perspective of each of the principals. Since a 
longer horizon agent can be better controlled by the long lived principal, the latter will 
prefer a long lived agent. The short lived principals, on the other hand, may prefer short or 
long lived agents. We show that if the two types of principals have opposed preferences in 
relation to the outcome of the agent's action, then the short lived principals will prefer a 
short lived agent. Otherwise, the short lived principal alive in the first period will also 
prefer long lived agents. 
Keywords: Multiple principals; Civil service 
JEL classification: D72; H l l  
Apart from differences of constituencies and goals, there is institutional rivalry 
between legislative and executive branches in the United States. . .  Men in 
politics want to count for something, to have power, and our government is set 
up in a way that tends to pit legislature against executive. Though the truth is 
probably not quite so simple, it usually appears that as one waxes the other 
wanes. In sum, seeking to protect their power and to respond to their con- 
stituencies and to further the goals they value, legislature and executive so often 
face each other as competitors or opponents that it is easy to accept their 
opposition as fundamental. (Mainzer (1973, p. 74).) 
1. Introduction 
All political bureaucracies are not created equal. Some, like that of the modern 
US Federal system, are composed of tenured civil servants at the lower levels, and 
of mostly political appointees at the upper levels. On the other hand, political 
bureaucracies in parliamentary systems have relatively fewer political appointees 
at their upper levels. Similar differences can be found at other levels of govern- 
ment in the United States, where some political bureaucracies at the local level 
have relatively more political appointees than others, although, at all levels, there 
has been an evolutionary trend toward a decrease in the proportion of political 
appointees. 
The main thrust of this paper is that differences in the organization of civil 
services can be understood as the result of a game among multiple principals for 
the control of the bureaucracy. While the bureaucracy is, in principle, directed by 
the executive branch of government, the legislature cannot be deterred from being 
involved in the determination of the policies the bureaucracy ought to follow. 
Thus, the bureaucracy has to respond to the interests of at least two political 
principals. These two principals, however, may differ in their political interests as 
well as in their political horizons. For example, from the beginning of this 
Century, U.S. legislators have tended to last substantially longer than presidents. 
Thus, the political horizons of legislators and Presidents have tended to diverge. 
P.T. Spiller, S. Urbiztondo ~European Journal of Political Economy 10 (1994) 465-497 467 
Also, in the United States the two branches are usually not controlled by members 
of  the same political party. This seems also to be the case for most other 
democracies based on the presidential system with strong legislative branches. 
Patronage, or the use of  political appointees at the high levels of  office at the 
discretion of  the executive, provides the latter with a bureaucracy that is, to a large 
extent, receptive to its interests. The legislature, on the other hand, prefers a 
bureaucracy that is more responsive to its own policy interests than to those of  the 
relatively transient member of  the executive. When legislators stay in power 
longer than presidents, they can use their expected longer presence to influence the 
bureaucracy in ways that the President, by staying in power only a relatively short 
period of  time, may not credibly do. In particular, the legislators may tilt the 
interests of  the bureaucracy by diminishing the ability of  the President to appoint 
a n d / o r  remove bureaucrats. As a consequence, the only incentive schemes that 
the President can use are those than can be implemented during its tenure. The 
President cannot impose long term penalties nor rewards, as once the President's 
tenure expires any policy implemented during his or her administration may be 
revoked. On the other hand, legislators can credibly use incentive schemes that 
transcend the duration of  the Presidential period. The use of  such incentives tilts 
the interests of  the bureaucracy towards the legislators' interests. Civil service 
provisions perform just that function. 1 This basic insight is at the core of  our 
explanation of  the organization of  civil services. 2,3 
We develop a three-actor-two-period game. In each period there are two 
principals and one agent. One of  the principals (congress) is present in both 
periods, while we let the second principal (the president) rotate from period to 
period. The agent (the bureaucracy) takes actions in each period that cannot be 
observed by either principal, but that influence the probability of  a particular event 
(higher bureaucratic effort brings down pollution levels, or decreases collusion, or 
brings down utility prices, etc). We explore the implications of  making the agent 
be present in both periods (i.e., granting civil service protection) by analyzing the 
game under two circumstances: with a permanent agent and with a sequence of  
agents. We explore this model also under two types of  assumptions concerning the 
principals' preferences. We first solve the model assuming that both prefer the 
1 Civil service provisions also have implications for incentives to invest in specific human capital. 
While these are important considerations, they are not useful in explaining the organizational 
differences discussed in the text. Thus, we do not consider them here. A model capturing those 
incentives is developed in Urbiztondo (1990). 
2 This view is also held by Wilson (1989), who notes that the US Congress was willing to give up 
the power to choose or replace public employees, among other reasons, because it was useful to restrict 
the president's power. 
3 This does not mean that both the President and Congressmen do not want to have public 
employees who fell intrinsically more identified with their objectives (call it political alignment). 
Nevertheless, given a particular ideological position of a public servant, the preferences of the chief 
executive and the legislature are claimed to depend on the length of time they will be in office. 
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same policy outcome (e.g., low pollution levels, associated with higher bureau- 
cratic effort), and we contrast the equilibrium to the one that arises when one of 
the principals (congress) prefers one particular outcome (e.g., low pollution), while 
the other principal prefers the opposite outcome. 
The following empirical implications arise from our framework. First, if the 
executive and the legislature are usually composed of individuals with relatively 
similar policy preferences (i.e., when both members of Congress and the president 
share the same goals in terms of industry regulation, distribution of income, etc.), 
then patronage at relatively high levels of office does not confer the executive with 
any particular advantage over the legislature, as both would be better off with the 
use of long lived bureaucrats (i.e. civil servants). 4 If, on the other hand, the 
executive and the legislature are usually composed of individuals with different 
and opposed preferences, then patronage confers the executive an advantage over 
civil service as it restricts the ability of the legislative branch to control the 
bureaucracy. In this case, then, we should expect patronage at high office levels to 
be more prevalent. 
We model separation of powers by allowing the two principals to differ in their 
policy preferences. Parliamentary systems, by requiring the executive to be formed 
from the legislature, tend naturally to have more uniformity of preferences across 
the government and the legislature than presidential systems. Not all parliamentary 
systems, however, are alike. Electoral rules and party organization have substantial 
implications for the extent of commonality between government and legislatures. 
In particular, two party parliamentary systems, h la UK, Canada or Jamaica, will 
have the strongest extent of commonality between the legislature and the execu- 
tive, as no coalitions are needed to maintain the government. Similarly, not all 
presidential systems are alike. Electoral rules here also make a difference. Disjoint 
presidential and legislative elections, as well as strong regional legislative repre- 
sentation tend to create preference divergences between the executive and the 
legislature. Thus, our first result suggests that patronage should be more prevalent 
in presidential than in parliamentary systems. 
Our second result deals with political systems with separation of powers. In 
systems with separation of powers, the organization of the bureaucracy will tend to 
arise from a bargaining between the legislature and the executive. Thus, those 
countries in which the legislators' bargaining power in determining public policy, 
or interest in the actual performance of the bureaucracy, is relatively small would 
tend to organize the bureaucracy so that it serves mostly the interests of the 
executive branch. Thus, patronage should also be more prevalent. This result helps 
to explain differences across countries like Mexico or the US, where the constitu- 
4 The scope of this case should be interpreted with care. The alignment of the executive and the 
legislature does not include the case where the party in the executive has also the majority in the 
legislature, as in this case that political party would prefer to have political appointees in order to limit 
the influence of the minority party in Congress. 
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tion and traditions have granted the legislature different levels of representative- 
ness, and as a consequence, different levels of interests in the actual working of 
the bureaucracy. 
These two empirical propositions help to explain the three features of civil 
service organization discussed at the beginning of the paper: the decline over time 
- during this Century - in the proportion of political appointees in the United 
States at the federal level, the relatively higher proportion of political appointees in 
the United States as compared to other occidental democracies, and finally, the 
different proportions of political appointees among cities of the United States. We 
explain these features by first, showing that over this Century, legislators' tenure 
started to increase, thus increasing their bargaining power vis-h-vis the President. 
At the same time, as public policy started to influence more directly the life of 
constituents, legislators local interests move away from patronage into policy, thus 
increasing their interests in the actual workings of the bureaucracy. Finally, 
different cities in the US have different forms of government. Some resemble 
parliamentary systems (i.e., no directly elected mayor), while others resemble 
presidential systems (i.e., have directly elected mayors). We use these similarities 
to explain their different use of patronage. 
In the following sections we develop a multiple principals-multiple period 
model from which the empirical implications discussed above emerge. We then 
present some evidence concerning the organizational differences of civil services 
across countries, US cities and over time. 
2. The model  
In this section we develop a stylized model of delegation with two principals in 
a two-period setting. The principals differ in one significant way: one principal 
lives for two periods and faces a sequence of two short lived principals, each 
living for just one period. We assume the agent can be of two types: she lives 
either one or two periods. This framework is chosen so as to resemble the 
institutional features of government: a long lived legislature, a short lived execu- 
tive and a bureaucrat who can be either a political appointee (i.e., short lived) or a 
career civil servant (i.e., long lived). 
We are interested here in exploring the type of agent that each principal prefers. 
If both principals prefer a long lived agent, then a long lived agent being chosen. 
If, however, one prefers a long lived agent and the other prefers a short lived 
agent, then bargaining between the two principals for the nature of the agent may 
result in the selection of a short lived agent. While we do not model the nature of 
the bargaining game between the two principals for the type of agent 5, our results 
suggest that short lived agents should have a higher probability of appearing in the 
5 Such bargaining game would depend on electoral and parliamentary rules not dealt with here. 
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presence of  principals with opposed interests. The reason being that in this case, at 
least one of  the principals would like to have a short l ived agent. This result has 
implications for our understanding of  Civil  Service structure. We  assume that the 
decision about which type of  agent to choose results from a bargaining game 
between the principals alive in period one, which is left unspecified. Long lived 
principals should prefer long l ived agents. Since a long lived principal has an 
instrument not available to the short l ived principal - a reward paid in a later 
period for a good performance in the earlier period - he may be able to better 
control the performance of  a long lived agent. Although this is well  documented in 
the (infinitely) repeated moral hazard literature (see for instance Radner (1985) 
and Rubinstein and Yaari  (1983)), we show that there are circumstances under 
which this instrument is indeed used in equilibrium when a sequence of  short l ived 
principals interact with another long lived principal and a long lived agent in a 
two-period model. 
We  make several assumptions about the environment in which this game takes 
place. Four issues in particular are worth discussing: actions, technology, prefer- 
ences and sequence. We describe them seriatim. 
The game is of  a moral hazard nature. Thus, agents take in each period (periods 
1 and 2) an unobservable action, e. Their action has implications on the outcome 
that appear in each period, x. While  the action e is continuous, there are only two 
feasible outcomes in each period, a high outcome and a low outcome. Let x i 
L h represent the outcome in period i. Then, x 1 = {x L, x~} and x 2 = {x 2 , x2}, where 
the subscripts denote the period and superscripts L and h denote low and high 
respectively. 6 Let d~h(e) be the probabil i ty that the random variable ~ equals x h 
when the level of  effort is e, where 4~h'(e) > 0, d~h~(e) < 0 and d~L(e) ffi 1 -- d~h(e) 
represents the probabili ty of  a low outcome. 7 Note that, since the equilibrium in 
period two can be a function of  what happened in period one, we need to 
distinguish the variables in period two according to whether the outcome in period 
one was high or low. Therefore, e2 h will  denote effort level e in period two after a 
high outcome in period one. 
6 Throughout the rest of the paper we refer to actions, transfers and preferences in a very abstract 
way. We have in mind the following concepts: the action is regulatory effort (which affects the 
outcome of the regulatory activity over which Congress - L - and successive presidents's - S l and $2 
- preferences are defined); Congress's transfers (T u,  TL2 and R) are legislation affecting the agency 
(especially the Budget, i.e., maintaining or increasing the budget of the agency, which translates into a 
reward), appropriations, and painful bearings and investigations; finally, President's transfers (Tsl and 
T~2) are recommendations of pay raises and promotions, defense of the agencies programs, endowing 
the agency with autonomy, kindly treatment, etc. Accordingly, we disregard potential influence exerted 
by presidential vetoes over appropriations made by Congress (see Kiewiet and McCubbins (1988) for 
an analysis of this issue). 
7 Unless indicated otherwise, superscripts' (") denote the first (second) derivative with respect to the 
argument that follows. 
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In each period the principals attempt to control the agent by offering contingent 
transfers. To avoid very large penalties, we assume that these transfers cannot be 
negative. That is, both Congress and the president cannot extract penalties from 
the bureaucrats. We also assume that the principals are risk neutral while the 
agents are risk averse. The agent, however, does not have access to the credit 
market, s For simplicity, we assume that the agents have separable utilities in 
income and effort, with the marginal disutility of  effort being normalized to 1. 
We can express, then, the expected utility functions of the short lived principal 
alive in period 1 (called $1), of the short lived principal alive in period 2 (called S h 
if the outcome in period one was high and S L if the outcome in period one was 
low) and of  the long lived principal (called L) in the following way: 
h h EUsl = (~bL( e l ) [  a'xl L --  Ts L ] =[" (~bh( e l ) [  d x l -  Ts l ] ,  (1) 
for j=L,h,  (2) 
EULffi=~h,L&J(e,)[bXJl--TJLl--R'+ E dp'(e~)(bx~--TJL,)], (3)  
j kffih,L 
where a is the marginal utility S1, $2 h and S L receive from x and b is the 
marginal utility L receives from x; T~I = (Tsl L, Ts h) is the transfer S 1 offers to the 
agent when the outcome in the first period is x L and x h respectively; Ts h = 
Lh hh 2, m. (Ts2 ,Ts2 ) and Ts L = (T~ LL, T~ Lh) are similarly defined for $2 h and S L" 9 TL 1 
(TL1, TLhl) (ThE = ( T ~ ,  TL hh) and TL2 = (TLI~, TL2h)) is the transfer L offers in the 
first (second) period depending on the observed outcome x I (x  2 after x h and x 2 
after xL), and R = (R L, R h) is the reward L offers in the second period to the 
agent according to the outcome that occurred in period one. We let b be positive, 
but a can be either positive or negative (i.e., it could be the case that the short 
lived principals prefer a low level of  effort.) Furthermore, the agent's utility at 
each period is given by 
UA1 = V(  TL1 + Tsl ) - e 1 
and 
UA2 ---- V(TL2 + Ts2 - F R )  --  e2 ,  
where V(O) = O, V'(T) > O, and V"(T) < 0 (i.e., the agent is averse to risk). Thus, 
the expected utility of an agent in period one is given by 
EUA( e l ,  e2)  = EUA1 + f lEUA2 , ( 4 )  
where fl represents the discount factor and expectations are taken with respect to 
~b(e). fl takes values zero and one: fl = 0 corresponds to a short lived agent, that 
s This assumption is admittedly strong and to a certain extent drives the results of the model. It is, 
however, commonly used in agency models (see Rogerson (1985a)). 
9 Ts~h, for example, represents S L's transfer when the outcome in period two is high. 
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is, a political appointee, (called A s) and /3 = 1 to a long lived agent (called AL) , 
that is, a career civil servant. Since transfers are assumed to be nonnegative for 
both x L and x h, the individual rationality constraints have to be satisfied in an 
ex-ante sense. 
Note that since the transfers and the rewards have to be nonnegative and b > 0, 
the long lived principal will effect zero transfers when x = x L (i.e., TL1 = TL2 L = 
T ~  = R L = 0) unless the agent 's  individual rationality constraint is binding. Also, 
the different horizons of  the two principals is here captured by the fact the long 
lived principal, L, can commit  in period 1 to a reward in period 2 according to the 
outcome that occurred in period 1.10 On the other hand, the short lived principal 
in period 1, $1, cannot. In the second period, though, both principals are short 
lived, as neither can offer transfers for the period ahead. Observe that if L could 
not commit  in period 1 to a compensation in period 2, then R h would be expected 
to be zero by the agent and it would not affect the development of  the game in the 
second period. 
Finally, we have to describe the timing of the model. It is as follows: 
(1) L and S 1 make simultaneous offers of  TL1 and R and T~I respectively; 
(2) A chooses et; 
(3) x I results and transfers are effected; 
(4) L and S 2 make simultaneous offers of  TL2 and Ts2 respectively; 
(5) A chooses e2; 
(6) x 2 results and transfers are effected. 
Note that the principals in each period play a Nash game between them. As 
Eqs. (1) to (3) suggest, the reward R h that L commits to give A L in the second 
period as a result of  a high first period outcome m a k e s e  2, TL2 and Ts2 depend on 
h* x I as it is explained later in the paper. Denote e 2 (e  the equilibrium level of  
effort in period two if the outcome in period one was high (low). Therefore, the 
solution of  the model is given by the 10th-tuple {e~, e2Kh *, e2L*, T~, T'L1, Ts2,h* 
T~2 L*, rLh2, T ~ ,  R* }, where 
j* "* -* 
e 2 = argmaxEUAJ2 given T:,~, TL~2 and R f for j = h ,L ;  
(AJ2's problem) 
e*  argmaxEUA given h* L* T.* T*  T.* 11 = e2 , e2 , sl ,  LI' s2' TI~2 and R* ; 
(A  1 's  problem) 
Ts* = argmax EU~I (S 1 's  problem) 
10 Think of L as giving A L a check at the end of period I that can only be cashed at the end of period 
2 as long as A is still working for L. The reward R, then, performs a similar role as a vesting pension 
plan. 
11 The dependence of T*, T* 2 and R* on x 1 is omitted to simplify notation. 
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subject to 
and 
e~', h* L* T* T.* T* e2 , e2 , LI~ s2, L2~ R *  
EUA( e' ~ , e~ ) >1 V ~  + flV,~ 2 , 12 
~bh( el)EUA2 ( e2 h ) + ~L( el)EUA2( e L) i> U2" 
T~* = argmax EUj2 
subject to 
j* '* 
e2 , TI~2, R j* 
and 
EUA2(e~*) t> U 2 f o r j = h , L .  
T'L1, R *  = argtlaax EUL, 
subject to 
h* L* , T.* * e~, e2 , e: , T: ,5, T~,  






( IRC~(2)  
(L's problem) 
(IRCA1) 
c ~ h ( e l ) E U A ( e h ) + ~ b L ( e l ) E U A ( e L ) > ~ U  A* . (Expected IRCA2 ) 
T~ = argmax EUL2 (xl ) ,  (L2J's problem) 
subject to 
j* T j* R j* e2 , s2 , 
and 
EU~&f)>~A for y=h,L (la¢~) 
Thus, in equilibrium, the agent, in both periods, maximizes her utility given the 
transfers offered and also, in period one, given the equilibrium evolution of the 
game. The short lived principals maxjmlze their utilities subject to the optimal 
reaction of the agent in their own period. Finally, the long lived principal 
maximizes his utility subject not only to the optimal reaction of the agent in the 
first period, but he also considers in period one his own equilibrium reaction in 
period two as well as that of the second period agent and the short lived principal. 
12 In what follows, ICCA1 and IRC^I (ICCA2 and IRCA2) denote Incentive Compatibility Constraint 
and Individual Rationality Constraint of the agent in period one (two) respectively. U*  (U~2) is the 
reservation value of the agent in period one (two), i.e., the utility she could obtain in case the contract 
is not signed. 
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In other words, in period one, the short lived principal alive in period one, the long 
lived principal and the agent (if she is also long lived) maximize their utilities 
subject to the (expected) equilibrium evolution of the game in period two. The 
game in period two is played conditional on what happened in period one. 
Given our assumptions about the stochastic production function ~b(e), we can 
sa fe ly  use the First Order Approach to solve this model. 13 The agents'  effort 
levels, e 1, e h and e L are then determined by the following first-order conditions: 
c~h'(el){V(Tsh + Thx) -- V(TsL) + flAEUAh2( Rh)} -- I = O ,  (ICCA1,) 
and 
qbJ(e,){dph'(e~)[V(Tj2 h + TJL~ + RJ)  - V(T/2 c + RJ)]  - 1} = 0  
for j =  h ,L ,  ( ICCJ2, )  
where 
AEU22( R h) = ~bL(e2h)v(T~2 hL + R h) + ~bh( e~ ) V ( T ~  + T~h2 h + R h) 
- ~bL(ez L)V(T~z LL ) -- ~bb(e L)V(ThLz - eL) >10 
is the change in the agent 's  expected utility in period two following a high 
14 outcome in period one. 
Note that, since ~bh'(.) is positive and V(.) is concave, an interior solution 
develops only if 
TtL2 h + Ts2 Lh > TLLs2 , TL~ + Ts~ h > Tsh2 L and TL ha + Ts~ > Ts L. 15 
3. A muitiperiod single principal-single agent model 
Before solving the model, let us consider as a benchmark the case in which 
there is only one long lived principal (with expected utility EUp) and one long 
lived agent. The purpose of this exercise is to show that there are conditions in 
which a long lived principal will prefer to deal with a long lived agent (i.e., that it 
is optimal for the principal to offer a second period reward). Here, the principal 's 
problem is to maximize his profits subject to the agent 's  incentive compatibility 
constraints in periods one and two. 
Assuming that the individual rationality constraints are not binding, the prob- 
lem is given by maxEUp(T h,~,. Oh,,~2Thh,.2TLh~, subject to ICC~I,  ICCAL'2 and ICC~2 
is See Rogerson (1985b). 
14 This change in utility cannot be negative, for otherwise the reward would have the effect of a 
punishment, and it would therefore be zero in equilibrium. 
1~ This is assumed to be the case throughout the paper. For ~bh'(0) approaching infinity the first two 
inequalities are necessary and sufficient conditions, whereas the last one is sufficient but not necessary. 
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with respect to T h and R h, where T2 hh and T ~  come from the principal's second 
period optimization. Since a positive reward affects the development of  the game 
in the second period, the problem has to be solved backwards. 16 Assuming an 
internal solution, the first-order conditions with respect to e h, T2 hh and A h (the 
Lagrange multiplier associated with I C C ~ )  characterize the equilibrium in the 
second period: 
ezh: ~b h' ( e h)[  b( x2 h - x [ ) - T hh ] 
"1- Ahfbh"(eh)[V(T hh + R h) --  v ( R h ) ]  = 0 ,  
T2hh: - 4'h(e2 h) + Ah4~h'(eh)V'(T~ + R h) = 0 ,  
A~:$h'(eh)[V(T hh + R h) - V(Rh)]  - 1 = 0 .  
Complete differentiation of this system of equations allows us to obtain the 
reaction of  e h and T2 ~ as R h changes. We show in the appendix, Section A.1, that 
for utility functions displaying nonincreasing risk-aversion the equilibrium level of  
effort in period two is a decreasing function of R h, whereas T2 hh increases with 
R h . 
We now proceed to solve the problem of the principal in period one. Let 
h* e 2 g (R  h) and *hh h = T~ •f(R ), with g ' (R  h) < O and f ' ( R  h) > O for R h >i O. Then 
the problem becomes 
max EUp(T h, R h, f ( R h ) ,  g ( R h ) )  with respect to ea, T h and R h, 
subject to ICC~a, IccL'2 and ICCAL'2 . a7 
Replacing A 1 and A h (the Lagrange multipliers associated with ICC~I and 
ICC~2) from the first-order conditions in the first and second periods respectively, 
and using the envelope theorem, the first-order condition with respect to R h 
becomes 
V t ( R h )  
~bh(el) -- 1 +/3~bL(e h) V,(Tx~----  + ~bh(e h) 
( V''T'hh+Rh ) ~ ,  V,(T2hh+Rh ) V ' ( R h ) ) ]  X fl v2(Th)  + 1 -  
V'(T~ + Rh) , h 
+~bh(el)~bh(eh)~ ~ ( f f ~  f ( R ) = 0 .  (5)  
16 Note that the equilibrium in period two depends on R h only if x 1 = x h. Therefore, we concentrate 
on the equilibrium in period two given that a high outcome occurred in period one. 
17 See the appendix for  a more detailed statement of the problem. 
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W e  can n o w  state the fo l lowing  Lemma.  
Lemma 1. A sufficient condition for  the equilibrium R h to be posit ive is that 
~bh(e) < 1 / 2 .  
Proof. W e  show this by contradict ion.  A s s u m e  first that R h - -  0. I f  this is the 
case the two per iods are separated and e 2h _- e2L and T h = T2 h. F r o m  the f irs t-order 
condi t ion  wi th  respect  to R h corner  solut ion (i.e., R h = 0) requires  that 
V ' ( 0 )  
[I - 4)h(e)(l +/3)] I> V,(Th-~-~-~ [/3- ~bh(e)(1 + 13)] +/3~bh(e)f'(0). 
Let /3 = 1. 18 Since V'(O)/V'(T h) > 1 for T h > O, this condition is satisfied 
only if ~bh(e) >i 1/2. 19 Thus, since R h = 0 implies that e is determined in a one 
period principal-ageut problem, situations in which the solution to the one period 
problem involve the implementation of a level of effort that results in 4)h(e) < 1/2 
produce  a contradict ion,  imply ing  that (at least) in those cases a posi t ive  reward 
emerges  in equi l ibr ium. 2o In footnote  20 we  show that those instances do exist.  21 
[] 
4. Characterization of  the solution when the principals' preferences are 
aligned 
In this sect ion we  l imit  the analysis to cases where  the pr incipals '  p references  
are al igned, so that both  prefer  a high ou tcome  in every  per iod (i.e., a > 0). This  
would ,  for example ,  be  the case where  both the President  and Congress  want  the 
regulatory agency  to put  more  effort  in price regulat ion or  pol lut ion control ,  or  
w h e n  the cabinet  is composed  of  member s  o f  the legislature.  22 
The  central  aspect  of  the p rob lem is to de termine  i f  a long l ived agent  (i.e., a 
career  c iv i l  servant)  wi l l  be employed.  W e  analyze this ques t ion by de termining  
18 Note that this equation is unambiguously satisfied as fl approaches zero. 
19 This is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition due to the fact that f'(0) > 0. 
20 To interpret this condition, note that a sufficient condition for a marginal R h, evaluated at R h = 0, 
to increase e I by more than it reduces e h (in expected sense), ceteris parihus (i.e., holding the transfers 
constan0, is that tbh(e)  < 1/2. The reward, then, can increase the expected level of aggregated effort. 
A proof of this result is available from the authors upon request. 
21Let, for example, ~bh(e )=2-e  -1, e~(1 /2 ,1 )  (so that &h(e)~(0,1)) and V(T+R)= 
- c -d(T+m (where c and d are two positive constants, and d is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute 
risk-aversion). It can then be easily checked that, for instance, letting c = 2, d = b = 1, and x h - x L = 1, 
the equilibrium level of effort is e = 0.62 (and then &h(e) = 0.387), which results in a contradiction to 
R h =0. 
22 For simplicity we also assume that the agents' individual rationality constraints are not binding in 
either period. 
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whether, in equilibrium, a positive reward is offered to be paid in the second 
period following a high outcome in the first. If a reward is offered the imple- 
mentability of a given level of effort in the second period is more difficult as the 
agent is wealthier and, because of the concavity of her utility function, has a lower 
marginal utility of money. On the other hand, the reward also diminishes the cost 
of implementing an action in the first period. This being the case, the short lived 
principal alive in period one is benefitted by the use of the reward by the long 
lived principal, whereas the short lived principal alive in the second period is 
harmed. Accordingly, S 1 prefers a long lived agent (i.e., a career civil servant) 
while S 2 would prefer a short lived agent (i.e., a political appointee). 
Note that for a > 0, as long as the individual rationality constraints are not 
binding, Tsl c = T~ =0 .  Thus, the first-order condition to Si 's problem (i.e., 
choosing its first-period transfer), results in 
1 ~h'(el)  (6') 
V,(T~ah + T~I) = Asl 4)h(el ) , 
where As, is the Lagrange multiplier of the agent's incentive compatibility 
constraint faced by the short lived principal in the first period and is given by 
-4,h'( e l ) [ a ( x ~ - x ' f  ) - ~] 
}ks1 = ~)h"(e,) [V(T~ + T~,)+/3aEU22(Rh)] " (6") 
with 
aEUA(R = + + + R ') 
- + - >_.0. 
As the above equation shows, 0As,/0 fl is negative, meaning that if the agent is 
long lived (i.e., if fl -- 1), a given level of effort can be implemented with a lower 
total transfer (Tshl + TLhl). That is, S, receives a positive externality from a positive 
reward R h. 
As we explained in the previous section, the long lived principal's problem in 
period one takes into account the evolution of the game in period two after a 
reward was granted. We solve the model backwards. The equilibrium in period 
two (after x h occurred in period one) is characterized by the following system of 
equations: 
~bh ' (e~)2[b(x~-x~) -  T~]  V'(Ts~ h + T~ + R h) 
- ~bh(e~) - d ? h . ( e h ) [ V ( T ~ + T ~ h + R h ) _ V ( R h ) ]  = 0 ,  (7) 
q~h'(e~)2[a(x~--x~)-  T~h] V'(Ts~ h + T~2 h + R h) 
hh = 0 ,  (8) --~bh(eh)-- dp (e2)[V(T•2 + 
dph' ( e~ )[ V'(Ts~ h + Th~ + Rh) - V ( R h ) ] -  1 = 0 ,  (9) 
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where the first equation results from Lh's problem (combining the first-order 
conditions with respect to T~  and e~), the second equation is similarly obtained 
from s2h's problem and the last one is the (common) first order condition with 
h' respect to the Lagrange multiplier (i.e., ICCA2). 
Here again, as in the case of one single principal, we can obtain the reaction of 
TI~, Ts2 hh and e2 h to changes in R h. In the appendix, Section A.2, we show that the 
equilibrium level of effort in period two is a decreasing function of the reward, 
whereas both T~2 and Ts2 hh increase with R h. 23 These reactions are considered by 
the long lived principal, who in period one maximizes EUL(TLhl, R h) subject to 
ICC~,I, ICC~2, and the optimal responses of $2 h and L h. As before, let TLh2  ----f(R h) 
and T~2 hh = h(Rh), with f ' (R  h) > 0 and h'(R h) > 0 for R h >t 0. Then the long lived 
principal's problem in the first period becomes 
maXEUL(T h, R h, f ( R h ) ,  h (Rh)) ,  with respect to el,T1 h and R h, 
subject to ICC~, 1, IccL'2 and ICC~2. 
Since both f ' ( R  h) and h'(R h) are positive for R h >1 0, to prove that there are 
cases for which this solution is interior requires exactly the same argument 
provided in Lemma 1 above and we omit it here. Once again, a sufficient 
condition for R h > 0 is that tkh(e) < 1 / 2  in the one period game. Thus, under 
conditions similar to those specified in Section 3, a reward is offered in equilib- 
rium when the agents' individual rationality constraints are not binding. 
To conclude this section, we note again that since a reward reduces the 
marginal cost of implementing a level of effort in period one, both S 1 and L prefer 
a long lived agent. On the other hand, since a reward makes the implementation of 
a level of effort more costly in the second period, S 2 prefers a short lived agent. 
We state this result in Proposition 1 below. 
Proposition 1. The equilibrium to the game described in Section H when L, S 1 
and S 2 prefer a high outcome and the agents" individual rationality constraints 
are not binding involves a positive reward given by L, which in turns leaves L and 
S 1 both preferring to deal with A L and S 2 preferring to deal with A s. 
5. Characterization of the solution when the principals' preferences are 
opposed 
In this section we analyze the solution when the principals' preferences are 
opposed under the assumption that the individual rationality constraints are still 
not binding. This case is meant to capture the Presidential system with division of 
23 It becomes obvious here that S 2 prefers a short lived agent, since as R h increases he pays a higher 
transfer for a lower action. 
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powers, where the same party does not have full control over both branches of 
government. We capture the principals' opposed preferences by letting a be 
negative and b positive. 24 As in the previous section, we explore the choice of 
bureaucrats by determining whether the short lived principals prefer to deal with 
short lived agents or not. 
Note that now T~I h = Ts~ = TLL1 = TLL2 = R L = 0. The equilibrium in the second 
period (after a high outcome in period one) is then characterized by the following 
system of equations: 
--d~h(e~)- ~bh'(e~)2[b(x~-XL)h" h hh h-- T~hh2]V'(T~'a~ + Rh) 
6 (e2)[V(rL~+R)--V(T~L+Rh)] =0, (10) 
dph'(eh2)2[a(xL--x h) - -  T hL] V ' / ' T h L  -~- R h ~  
s2 I ~, s2-  ,] 
- ~bL(e~) - dph.(e~)[V(Tt~+Rh)_V(T~L+Rh)]----0, (11) 
h' h hh ,I, (e=)[v(r£2 + Rh) -- V(T~L + Rh)] --1=0, (12) 
where the first equation 'results from L~'s problem (combining 'the first-order 
conditions with respect to T~  and e2h), the second equation is similarly obtained 
from S~'s problem and the last one is the (common) first-order condition with 
h' respect to the Lagrange multiplier (i.e., ICCm). Here again, as in the case of 
aligned interests, we can obtain the reactions of T~,  Ts~ L and e2 h to changes in 
R h. In the appendix, Section A.3, we show that e~ and T ~  are decreasing 
functions of the reward, whereas T~h~ increases R h. 25 
Considering these reactions in the second period, we can now solve the 
problem of the long lived principal, who in period one maximizes EUL(T~I, R h) 
subject to ICCZ. ICC 2, and the optimal responses of and As before, let 
T~ = f ( R  h) and T ~  = h(Rh), with f ' ( g  h) > 0 and h'(R h) < 0 for R h/> 0. 56 
Combining L's first-order conditions, and recalling that f (R h) and h(R h) are 
T~ and T~ L respectively, a comer solution (i.e., R ~ = 0) requires 
v,(r?) 
[1 - ~bh( e)(1 +/3)] >i __V'(Td---~[ fl- dph( e)(1 +/3)] +/3~bh(e)f'(O) 
v'(r?) 
+ )V,(T~ ~[/3~bL (e) -- ~bh(e)] h'(O). 
Qualitatively similar results follow if we let a > 0 and b < 0. In this case, though, none of the 
short lived principals would prefer a long lived agent. 
Using Assumptions 1 and 2 in the appendix, it can also be shown that the second-order condition 
for an interior maximum is satisfied for the principals wanting a low action as well. The proof is 
available from the authors upon request. 
The appendix shows, in Section A.3, the precise statement of  the problem and the derivation of the 
first-order conditions. 
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As in the previous cases, ~b h < 1 / 2  provides a sufficient condition for R h to be 
positive. The proof  is given in the next footnote. 27 Thus, provided that the reward 
is positive ( implying a higher level of  effort implemented in period one and a 
lower level of  effort in period two), L prefers a long lived agent. For the same 
reason, i.e., because the cost of  implementing any action increases in the first 
period when a positive reward R h is offered, S 1 prefers a short l ived agent so as to 
avoid the use of  R h by L. S 2, on the other hand, benefits from the reward since he 
is able to implement a lower action at a lower cost when a reward is obtained by 
the agent. This result is summarized in Proposition 2 below. 
Proposition 2. The equilibrium to the game described in Section 2 when L 
prefers a high outcome, S I and S 2 prefer a low outcome and the agents' 
individual rationality constraints are not binding involves a positive reward given 
by L, which in turn leaves L and S 2 preferring to deal with A L and S 1 preferring 
to deal with A s . 
Summarizing the results of  Propositions 1 and 2, our model  predicts that when 
the principals '  objectives are aligned, a long lived agent will  be chosen. When 
their preferences are opposed, though, the probabil i ty of  encountering a short l ived 
agent is increased, as one of  the principals alive in period one prefers to deal with 
this type of  agent rather than with a long lived one. 
6. Binding individual rationality constraints 
In this section we briefly explore the consequences of  binding individual 
rationality constraints for the agents. 
Consider first the case when the preferences of  both principals are aligned (i.e. 
a > 0), i.e, the case meant to describe the Parliamentary system of  government. 
Suppose that U*  is exactly equal to the expected utility received with the above 
contract (i.e., IRCA1 is just binding). The question is whether the contract of  
27 Let fl = 1. Providing a contradiction becomes more difficult now, since for th h < 1/2, ~bhf'(0)+ 
[V'(TsL)/V'(TLh)](1--2t~h)h'(0) can be either positive or negative. Nevertheless, we can show that 
0 > h'(R h) > [V'(TL h)-  V'(TsL)]/V'(Ts L) for all R h >t 0. (This requires a very tedious procedure, the 
full derivation of which is available from the authors upon request. The steps to follow are the 
following: (a) Write down the expression for oT~hL/oR h = h'(g h) from the system of equations in the 
appendix; (b) Compare h'(R h) with [V'(T h ) -  V'(TsL)]/V'(TL); and (c) Cancel out terms from both 
sides whenever possible until one side has only negative terms and the other side has only positive 
terms.) We need only, then, consider two extreme cases: 
(i) h'(0)= 0. Then, the equation above reduces to the same one we found in the previous sections. 
Once again, a contradiction with R h = 0 is obtained if ~b h < 1/2; 
(ii) h'(0)= [V'(Th) - V'(TsL)]/V'(TsL). Then, the equation above reduces to 0 >/~bhf'(0), which is 
impossible for all ~b h, resulting in R h > 0. 
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Section 4 will still be an equilibrium? The answer is yes, as both principals prefer 
a high action and therefore want the agent to participate in the game. If  the 
individual rationality constraints were not satisfied by the contract in Section 4, 
though, the new (Nash) equilibrium will require increasing the equilibrium trans- 
fers, and a solution involving zero rents for the agent will develop. Thus, when the 
objectives of  the two principals are aligned, relaxing the assumption that the 
individual rationality constraints for the agents are not binding can only lead to 
minor changes in the equilibrium, which would now be further characterized by 
zero rents being captured by the agent. 
Now consider a < 0 and suppose that IRCA1 just binds when the contract 
offered is the one given in Section 5. It is easy to see that this contract (as long as 
the solution is interior) cannot be an equilibrium, since S 1 (and S 2 in period two) 
can withdraw his transfer to induce agent nonparticipation, the cheapest way to 
obtain his favorite outcome (i.e. x = 0). Therefore, L has to satisfy the individual 
rationality constraint with his offer as if S 1 and S2's offers were zero. Since S 1 and 
S 2 offer positive transfers, the agent captures rents when the principals objectives 
are opposed. 28 Thus, an implication of  our framework is that, in general, 
bureaucrats' rents should be higher in systems with divided government than in 
Parliamentary systems. 
7. Some observations on the organization of  civil services 
Consider, first, the evolution of  the civil service in the United States. The first 
movement away from patronage was the period following the Pendleton Act of  
1883, 29 and the subsequent extension of  public positions subject to the 'merit  
system' until the turn of  the century. The second movement of  civil service reform 
occurred during the 1920s and 1930s. 30 Fig. 1 summarizes this evolution. 31 
There are, at least, two views on the original passage of  the Pendleton Act. One 
sees the Pendleton Act as resulting from an attempt by the Republican Party to 
limit the benefits the Democrats were going to enjoy from the 'spoils system' after 
the 1884 elections, as a Democratic victory was easily foreseeable at that time. 
28 This result is obtained in a more general framework by Bernhein and Whinston (1986). See Spiller 
(1990) for a similar treatment of the individual rationality constraints. 
29 The Pendleton Act was the first legal piece protecting public employees from partisan discretion, 
and reached, initially, about ten percent of the federal employees. See Van Ripen (1958). 
3o For example, the Rogers Act of 1924 extended the merit principle to the State Department, and the 
Hatch Act of 1939 prohibited federal employees from participating in electoral activities. See Van 
Ripen (1958) and Knott and Miller (1987) for a detailed discussion of the evolution of the U.S. civil 
service. 
31 Note the decline of merit appointments during the New Deal, where the Executive temporarily 
gained power over Congress. 
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The Democrats, it is claimed, supported the project (which they had presented a 
year before), because they were interested in an article limiting public employees' 
contributions to Republican campaigns (see, e.g. Van Ripen (1958) and Knott and 
Miller (1987)). The other view, recently presented by Johnson and Libecap (1990), 
is that the evolution of the civil service in this period obeys two factors. First, 
because the federal bureaucracy concerned itself mostly with postal and customs 
services, big users of those services exerted pressure over their legislators to pass a 
civil service reform so as to improve their efficiency. This issue is also recognized 
by Van Ripen (1958) and Knot and Miller (1987), who note the influence of the 
'Progressive Reformist Movement', composed of professional middle-class tax- 
payers, urban merchants, rural populists and northeastern dogooders, who de- 
manded a change towards a more efficient, nonpartisan and professional public 
service. Second, patronage, it is claimed, provided negative marginal benefits to 
the President as the latter had to devote substantial amount of time to the selection 
process (see Johnson and Libecap (1990)). 
While both arguments may be correct, they fail to take into account that civil 
service legislation exists in all democracies, and that many of the civil service 
reforms across countries happened at similar historical times. Furthermore, since 
these explanations are based on particular historical accidents, they cannot account 
for differences across countries in the structure of civil service organizations. 
Our model, while consistent with the previous theories with respect to the 
evolution of the U.S. merit system during last century, explains the timing of civil 
service reforms in the United States during this century as being the result of the 
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decline in party discipline and the increase in the length in office of the US 
Congressmen. 32 
The members of Congress' declination of 'party loyalty' is a well documented 
stylized fact. 33 For example, Knott and Miller (1987, p. 81) note, tha t"  Party-based 
voting in the House, which had been at 50 percent in 1897.. .  decreased during the 
reform era to35  percent in 1905 and to 23 percent in 1911. Legislators found it 
necessary to vote with their interest group constituencies rather than with party 
leaders". Furthermore, they note that "ticket splitting also greatly increased. The 
number of counties in which the trailing Republican fell at least 5 percent behind 
the ticket leader increased from just over 4 percent in 1894 to just over 40 percent 
in 1910". 34 As the activities of Congress started to touch individual constituen- 
cies differently, members of Congress started to bend their party loyalty, and to 
vote their particularistic interests. 
As to the increase in the average period in office of Congressmen at the turn of 
the century, Fig. 2 shows that Senators' expected length in office increased rapidly 
during the turn of the nineteenth century and following Word War II. 35,36 
Until the turn of the century, then, we can see that the legislative branch was an 
appendix of the executive branch, and that the Congressmen that were members of 
the party in control of the executive branch advocated for patronage against the 
interests of the party with minority in Congress. Our model predicts, then, that 
until that time the organization of the bureaucracy should have served the interests 
of the executive, that is, the bureaucracy should be characterized by political 
appointees. While we agree that the evolution of the merit system during the first 
twenty years from the passage of the Pendleton Act responds to the reasons given 
32 Similar timing seems to explain the introduction of civil service regulations (i.e. meritocracy) in 
Great Britain. While patronage through the executive, with the tacit approval of the King, was the norm 
through the 18th century, meritocracy started to be implemented in the 1850-1860s following the 
Northcote-Trevelyan Report. This is precisely the time at which the Cabinet and the Parliament 
became more aligned. See Cox (1987, in particular p.51). See more on this below. 
33 Note that if this were not the case we could not really argue that Congress and the president are 
two different principals, for in fact the political parties could have been dictating their behavior. This is 
particularly the case when the party in the White House had also a majority in Congress, something 
quite common during the nineteenth century. 
34 This, however, may be the result of the introduction of the Australian ballot electoral system. 
3s The data on which Fig. 2 is based are constructed in the following way: (1) From the Biographical 
Directory of the United States Congress, we calculate the number of personnel changes in each Senate 
and divide that number by the number of changes due every period (one third of the members). Call 
that ratio the probability of losing the seat (PL); (2) The expected life in office for a given period is 
then 6 " ( 1 +  Pw + Pw 2 + -- .)  = 6 / ( 1 -  Pw), where Pw = 1 -  PL- (3) Taking moving averages of five 
previous, the current and four posterior periods, we call the resulting number 'Expected life in office'. 
The computation of a similar statistic for the House of Representatives would be extremely cumber- 
some, as the number of representatives from each state varies over time. 
Garand and Gross (1984) also note that there has been a long-term trend toward congressional 
safety, probably since 1894. See Kernell (1977) for a discussion of the reasons why House membership 
became more stable at the turn of the nineteenth century. 
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prev ious ly  by other  authors, we  argue, though, that by the turn o f  the century the 
legis la t ive branch became  more  independent  f rom the execut ive ,  and thus it started 
to restrict the abili ty o f  the execut ive  to control  the bureaucracy,  its instrument  
be ing  the further extension o f  c ivi l  service  reforms.  37 
Consider ,  now,  the d i f ferences  in the compos i t ion  o f  the h igher  civil  service in 
the Uni ted  States and in the par l iamentary democrac ies  o f  Wes te rn  Europe,  in 
particular,  Great  Britain, France and Wes t  Germany.  Since  in par l iamentary  
democrac ies  the execu t ive  is composed  of, and needs  the support  f rom,  member s  
o f  the legis la t ive  branch, our  mode l  wou ld  character ize  this type o f  poli t ical  
37 Some students of the organization of the US government have raised this issue before. For 
example, Malnzer (1973, p.99) says "Patronage gives the chief executive a means of shaping the 
public service. When the governmental system itself is uncertain or threatened, as under Washington or 
Lincoln, patronage may be used to recruit men loyal to the regime... When merit service is routine and 
rigid, patronage (whether or not the appointees are party loyalists) may be used to recruit men that are 
vigorous, imaginative and committed to administration programs". Moe (1989) argues that interest 
groups influence Congressmen to limit presidential appointments in his attempts to obtain effective 
control of the bureaucracy. Fiorina (1986) also argues that Congressmen and bureaucrats enjoy a 
mutually beneficial relationship throughout time. Finally, Wilson (1989) argues that the notion that the 
president should administer and hold accountable to him the executive branch agencies was only 
established at the be~nning of this century. Since the services provided at the time did not require 
highly specialized labor (nor did they provide substantial 'on the job learning') and congressmen 
remained for a short time in office, patronage produced considerably more benefits than costs to 
legislators. Wilson's argument,however, does not violate our model, as civil service legislation would 
have been the result of both congressmen's increased length in office and their reaction to limit the 
control of the bureaucracy by politically more powerful presidents. 
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system as one where both the long lived principal (i.e. parliament) and the short 
lived principal (i.e. the prime minister and the cabinet) have similar preferences. 
The organization of  the bureaucracy, then, should serve - as much as possible - 
their common interests, that is, should be based on long lived bureaucrats, or civil 
servants. Thus, parliamentary democracies should have a lower percentage of  
political appointees than democratic countries based on the presidential system. 3s 
Great Britain has had a parliamentary system of  government since the end of  
the seventeenth century, with parliament's power becoming dominant since the 
middle of  the eighteen century, with parliament's and the executive's objectives 
becoming more aligned around the 1860s. 39 The executive power is delegated to 
a prime minister, who can only be installed and remain in office with the support 
of  parliament. 4o 
In France, during the Third and Fourth Republics, from 1875 to 1958, Prime 
Ministers (and the presidents in the Fourth Republic) were elected by the 
Assemblte Nationale (the French parliament). Also, party discipline was weak. 
With the Fifth Republic, and in particular since 1962, the power of  the Presidency 
has increased. The President is currently elected directly by voters, and has 
received several new attributions. This shift in the allocation of  power coexists, 
however, with the necessity to form a coalition government that is still in charge 
of  most domestic affairs. 
Finally, West Germany has gone through many different stages since 1870. 
From the Bismarck to the Nazi era, the different regimes were characterized by a 
very strong executive. Since 1949, however, West Germany, has had a parliamen- 
tary democracy, characterized by strong legislature and a mostly ceremonial 
President. 41 
The unifying characteristic of  these European countries is that during the period 
of  formation of  the current public service agencies, there was not a politically 
powerful institution that would, according to our model, prefer the bureaucracy to 
be based on political appointees. Although this situation has changed to some 
3s Note that according to our model this empirical implication is irrespective of which branch is 
formally (or informally) in control of the bureaucracy. 
39 Interestingly, it is in this period that major civil service reforms were introduced in Britain. Cox 
(1987, p. 133) notes that "the local Civil Service patronage of which the member of Parfiament 
disposed declined throughout the nineteenth century. Positions in the revenue, postal, and other 
geographically dispersed branches of the Civil Service were regularly referred to the recommendation 
of the local member in the early part of the century. However, patronage in the revenue dep~rtments 
began to decline with Lord Liverpool's renunciation in 1820 of the direct appointment of superior 
offices in the Customs Service; and the reforms initiated by the Northcote-Trevelyan Report (1853), 
and furthered by Gladstone's Order in Council establishing open competition (1870), cut back the 
patronage throughout the Civil Service". See footnote 31. 
4o See Roberts and Lovecy (1984) and Deutsch et al. (1981) for a detailed analysis of the functioning 
of political systems in the countries discussed here. 
411nterestingly, the Bundestag has a high proportion of former upper career civil servants. For 
instance, Roberts and Lovecy (1984, p. 134) report that civil servants and permanent officials of parties 
and interest groups comprise sixty percent of the Bundestag. 
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extent  in France,  i t  is still the case that a par l iamentary  coal i t ion is  required to 
install a government ,  and hence  at least  the part o f  the execut ive  branch deal ing  
wi th  domes t ic  issues has to ref lect  Par l i ament ' s  o w n  preferences.  
The  Uni ted  States, on  the other  hand, has had separat ion o f  powers  since its 
creation,  and as noted above,  s ince the beg inn ing  o f  this century member s  o f  
Congress  have  n o t  only  been  easi ly reelected,  but  also they have  had a h igh  degree  
o f  au tonomy wi th  respect  to partisan preferences.  42 
Given  the different  sys tems o f  gove rnmen t  (and indeed of  power  al locat ion)  
descr ibed above,  it is natural  that these bureaucracies  are shaped differently.  
A c c o r d i n g  to our  model ,  the degree  o f  pol i t izat ion should be  re la t ively h igher  in 
the U.S.  and re la t ively lower  in Great  Britain, France  and Wes t  Germany.  
Compara t ive  studies o f  c ivi l  service provide  support  to our  theory. Fesler  (1983, 
p. 88), for  example ,  p rovides  ev idence  that the ratio o f  high-pol i t ical  to h igh-career  
off icials  in the U S  is 1 : 5 ,  whi le  in Great  Britain and France  is 1 : 4 0  and in 
Ge rmany  is 1 : 80. 43 These  differences,  however ,  have  been  prev ious ly  expla ined 
as the result  o f  diverse  tradit ions (the effect  o f  the ' unwr i t t en  l aws ' ) ,  o f  different  
economies  o f  scale, and of  publ ic  opin ion  influence.  44 
42 Furthermore, the extent of electoral split between Congress and the Executive has increased since 
at least the New Deal. Jacobson (1990) provides a detailed analysis of the extent of electoral split, not 
only between Congress and the President, but also between the House and the Senate. See also Fiorina 
(1990). 
43 With respect to the typical european agency, Fesler (1983, p.90) goes on to say that " . . . i t  
presumably takes into account more long-range and general-interest considerations than does an 
American Department with its short lived political appointees". Also, Heclo (1977, p. 107) notes that, 
compared to the U.S., he "[does] not know of any other developed Nation in which the executive 
management of the government's senior civil service is left to the tender mercies of temporary political 
appointees". Furthermore, ".political appointees are simply uninterested. Effective management of the 
higher civil service is of immense long-term importance. But nothing will have very much effect during 
an appointee's own short time in office. Most appointees behave exactly as you and I would if faced 
with the same incentives: they exploit careerists and do little to build career institutions." 
44 For example, reviewing the possible determining factors that influence the different shape of 
higher civil services, Stanley (1983, p. 93) notes that "Great Britain, Canada, France, Germany, and the 
United States differ in political history, structure, and culture. All but the United States have a 
parliamentary form of government, with its intertwining of legislative and executive work. Three of the 
five countries are federal; two are unitary. Transitions among the ruling parties vary in their frequency 
and in their effects on the different bureaucracies, as does the degree of popular and political regard for 
the public service... Finally, the bureaucracies themselves differ from one country to another in their 
composition (social, ethnic, educational), in their traditional behavior and attitudes, and in their 
political strength". Pfiffner (1987), on the other hand, while in principle focusing the attention on the 
same issues as we do here, i.e. the separation of powers, conjectures that lack of party control over both 
branches of government implies that the civil service will have a higher percentage of political 
appointees. Wilson's (1989) explanation overlaps with ours, as it stresses the importance of different 
political systems, although it overlooks the relevance of different time horizons. In addressing the 
question of different use of political appointments between Great Britain and the United States, Wilson 
(1989, pp. 257-258) argues that "In a word, the answer is the Constitution. That document makes the 
president and Congress rivals for control of the American administrative system... In Great Britain, 
the prime minister and parliament are not rivals because the House of Commons has no significant 
power to supervise, investigate, intervene in, or even obtain answers from the bureaucracy." 
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Finally,  consider  the d i f ferences  in the organiza t ion  o f  the c iv i l  services  in the 
Uni ted  States at the local  leve l  o f  government .  The  main  feature to expla in  is the 
different ial  use o f  mer i t  sys tems across cities. 45 W h e n  the mayor  is e lected 
direct ly  by voters  the local  fo rm of  gove rnmen t  resembles  the presidential  sys tem 
wi th  separat ion o f  powers ,  since there is no need  for  the mayor  and the counci l  to 
share the same pol icy  goals.  46 I f  e lected indirectly,  the mayor  responds to the 
counci l  and therefore  there is no real separat ion o f  powers ,  the local  analog to 
par l iamentary  systems. W e  find, as predicted by our  model ,  that, even  cons ider ing  
regional  differences,  there is a negat ive  correlat ion be tween  comple te  adopt ion o f  
mer i t  sys tems and mayors  be ing  e lected direct ly across ci t ies ove r  25,000 inhabi-  
tants. In Table  1, we  es t imate  the determinants  o f  comple te  adopt ion o f  c ivi l  
service  legislat ion.  W e  use as explanatory var iables  the form of  government ,  
populat ion and the regional  locat ion o f  the cities. The  es t imated coeff ic ient  o f  the 
fo rm of  gove rnmen t  is negat ive  and significant,  p rov id ing  some  support  to our 
theory. A t  the mean  va lues  o f  the explanatory variables,  a change  towards  directly 
e lected mayor  wi thout  a ch ie f  adminis t ra t ive  off icer  ( C A O )  decreases  the probabi l -  
ity o f  comple te  adopt ion o f  mer i t  sys tems by twenty percentage  points. 47 
45 Although studies of the different systems of local government in the U.S. usually focus on whether 
those are mayor-council or council-manager ones (where the latter system avoids the separation of 
powers) we prefer to consider whether the mayor (without a chief administrative officer - CAO - who 
is a professional administrator responsible for the daily management of the city, and whose nomination 
sometimes requires council approval) is elected directly by voters or not (in which case the Mayor is 
generally selected by the council among its members) as the real measure of whether there is separation 
of powers or not. Since almost all the cities with mayor without CAO (MWCAO) (78 out of 79 in our 
sample) have direct elections, the results reported below remain almost intact when we just consider all 
cities with MWCAO governments. 
'~ This is especially true for mayors without CAOs, as these are professional. Adrian (1988, p.9), for 
example, notes that "With the success and continuing expansion of the office of CAO and the 
ever-wider use of the merit system, differences in professionalism between the two forms continue to 
diminish". 
47 There is at least another feature that can be explained by our model, named that the proportion of 
political appointees is a negative function of the population of the city. For example, Stahl (1971) 
reports that "all cities of 250,000 or over (inhabitants), except one, have total or almost total 
merit-system coverage for their civil services... Among cities with 50,000 to 250,000 population, only 
about 12 percent are without merit systems... About 22 percent of those in the 25,000 to 50,000 class 
are so handicapped". There are two feasible reasons for this correlation. First, excluding the five 
largest cities in the US, the probability of a direct system of election for the mayor without CAO, i.e., 
the local parallel of presidential systems, decreases with city size. This is supported by the following 
estimated probit model 
Prob(MDEWCAO ffi 1) ffi , ib(- 0.68 -0.00504 Pop + 0.0000074 Pop 2) 
(t-stat) ( - 5.23 X - 2.76) (2.88) 
Log-likelihood = - 192.64, % right predictions = 83, 437 observations, 
with the critical value of population at which its effect becomes positive being 340.540, well above the 
mean size in the sample (94 percent of the cities are below this value). Second, the average length in 
office for councilmen increases with city size: 50 percent of the council members of cities over 500,000 
inhabitants remain in office five years or more; for cities in the range 250,000-500,000, 100,000- 
250,000, 25,000-100,000, the corresponding percentages are 48, 40 and 38 percent respectively. 
(Source: Municipal Year Book, 1972.) Our model, then, would suggest that Civil Service provisions 
should be more prevalent in larger cities, as seems to be the case according to Staid. 
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Table 1 
Estimation results a,b 
Independent Dependent 
(T-statistic) CS CS CS 
Constant - 0.228 - 0.219 0.026 
( - 2.84) ( - 2.13) ( - 0.20) 
MDEWCAO - 0.436 - 0.438 - 0.514 
( - 2.59) ( - 2.60) ( - 2.92) 
Population 0.00139 0.00124 0.0015 
(thousands) (3.01) (1.12) (3.16) 
Pop. squared 2.08 E - 7  
(0.14) 
South - 0.887 
( - 4 . 7 2 )  
Midwest - 0.313 
( - 1.96) 
West 0.37 
(1.98) 
Log-likelihood - 291.99 - 291.98 - 270.22 
% right predictions 57 58 66 
No. of observations 442 442 442 
a Method: Probit. Year 1963. 
b Variables: CS (Civil Service)= 1 if all employees are covered by civil service legislation, 0 
otherwise; MDEWCAO (mayors directly elected without C AO)=  1 if the city has this type of 
government, 0 otherwise; South (includes Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas and Virginia) = 1 if the cities belongs to the region, 0 otherwise; 
Midwest (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, 
North Dakota and South Dakota)= 1 if the city belongs to the region, 0 otherwise; and West 
(Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Utah, Wyoming, California, Oregon and Washington) = 1 if the 
city belongs to the region, 0 otherwise. 
Source: Municipal Year Book, 1963, 1972 and 1976. The 1963 Municipal Year Book is the most 
recent to classify dries over 25,000 inhabitants according to complete, partial and nil scope of civil 
service coverage of municipal employees (there are 611 observations of cities); the 1972 issue has the 
nearest (in time) series of  city governments discriminating by election system and existence of CAO, so 
it is used (except for a few cities in which the statistic is lacking, in which cases it is completed with 
observations of the 1976 issue) whenever possible, resulting in 442 observations (169 were los0. 
To summarize, a framework that sees in civil service regulations ways to 
restrict the ability of the executive to control the bureaucracy is consistent with 
some stylized facts of the organization of civil services across countries, local 
governments and over time in the U.S. (once again, during this century). 
The model that we develop below is rooted in the transaction cost/agency 
approach to institutions, where the nature of organizations is the result of the need 
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to control. Our framework combines institutional features, like separation of 
powers and the need to delegate, with the modern theory of common agency in a 
multiperiod setup. 48 The organization of political bureaucracies, however, will 
differ depending on the characteristics of the principals the bureaucracy is 
supposed to serve. 
8. Conclusions 
This paper presents a model that can be used to explain the evolution of the 
U.S. Federal Civil Service during this century, the relatively high number of 
political appointees in the U.S. compared with other western democracies, and the 
different proportion of political appointees in different U.S. cities. The key factors 
are the separation of legislative and executive powers, the effective residence of 
that power, the expected life in office for Congressmen, and party discipline. 
We argue that during the nineteenth century members of Congress remained in 
office for short periods of time, and party discipline was strong, with the party 
represented in the executive usually being the majority party in Congress. This 
being the case, neither of the two principals competing for public service positions 
were particularly interested in long term agents. As a result, the number of 
political appointees was relatively high. 
On the other hand, the twentieth century witnessed the decline of party 
discipline and the increase in the length in office of Congressmen. Thus, the 
composition of the civil service's labor force can be understood as the outcome of 
a game played by one short and one long lived principals (the president and 
Congress respectively), which in turn lead to the extension of civil service 
legislation over this century. Finally, our model predicts that the stronger Congress 
is (or alternatively, the more aligned Congress and the Executive are), the fewer 
political appointees will be in the civil service, a characteristic observed across 
countries and U.S. cities as well. 
Appendix 
In what follows we make the following assumptions: 
Assumption 1. ~bh'(e)/~bL(e), i.e., the hazard rate, increases with e, i.e., 
_ ~bh~(e)~bL(e) < ~bh'(e)2.49 
4s For models of common agency, see Bernhein and Whinston (1986). See also Spiller (1990) and 
Laffont and Tirole (1988) for applications. For agency models with multiple periods, see Radner (1985) 
and Rubinstein and Yaari (1983). 
49 This assumption is standard in the information literature. It basically says that given that a high 
outcome has not occurred, increasing effort makes its appearance each time more likely. It is respected 
by many distributions, in particular by ~bh(e)ffi 2-- e -1 (e ~ (1//2,1)). 
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Assumption 2. --~bh"(e)/~bh'(e) decreases with e, but not 'too fast', 
2 >I (qbh'(e)dY(e)/dPh"(e) 2) >t 1. 50 
i.e., 
Assumption 3. V(.) displays nonincreasing aversion towards risk, i.e., 
[V(T  + R) - V( R ) I V " ( T  + R)  >t [V ' (T  + R) - V ' (  R ) ] V ' ( T  + R) 
and 
[V(T  + R)  - V( R ) ] V " (  R)  <~ [V'(T + R) - V ' (  R ) ] V ' (  R) .  
A.1. Equilibrium in period 2: One principal-one agent 
W e  now start with the problem of the single principal. The problem is given 
by 51 
maxZ = {t~L( el)[ bx L + t~L(e L)bx L + ~ h ( e ~ ) ( b x ~ _  T (h )] 
+ +h(el)[bxhl _ T  h _  R h+ ~ L ( e  h)bx L+ ~bh(e h)(bx h _ T  h)} 
d- A l{ t~h ' ( e l ) [  V(T1 h)-{'- [~AEUAh2( Rh)] - 1} 
+ ~L(ea)A~{~h ' (eL)V(T~h) - - I  } 
+ ~ba(e,) Ah{~bh'(e~)[V(T hh + R h) - V(Rh)] -- 1}, 
with respect to el, T h, R h, }[1, e J, Ti h and AJ for j = h, L. We solve the problem 
backwards. The system of first-order conditions for ph is given in the main part of 
the paper. Totally differentiating that system, and after replacing [ b(x h - x2 L) - T h ] 
and A~ from these first-order conditions we have 52 
- -  ..}.. - -  
~h'~ V, ~h' v '  ] de2h+ _ ~ h ' + - - 7  dr2hh 
(~ h~ h" 
+ ~ V  dA~= - ~bh, V-----~AV' dR h, 
50 This assumption is satisfied by the density function referred to in the previous footnote. 
51 Note that w e  already set transfers and reward equal to zero when the outcome is low, that is, 
R L = T L = 7 L = 0. Also,  note the use of  the first-order approach to the principal-agent problem. 
52 For ease of notation we suppress the arguments e2 h from ~bh(e), 4,h'(e~), 0h"(eeh), and qbh~(e~). 
Similarly, V'=V'(Tehh + Rh), V"="V(Tehh + Rh), AVf[V(T2hh + R)--V(R)]>O and AV'= 
[V'(T~ + R)-  V'(R)] < o. 
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[__0h. 0 ~  "] 6"V" ~ 0hv" 
=~--dr~ h + O h'v' da~ = V' dR". +-~-~-I de~ + - - -  
0~V de2 h + 0a ' v  ' dT~ = - 0 ~ V '  dR a. 
The determinant (A) of the system above reduces to 
A = 0~W'(3O h"2 - Oh~b h') -- 2 0 ~ b h ' ~ w  ' V' ' 
which is positive by Assumption 2. Also, using Cramer's Rule, we obtain 
- O~+~aW'(Rh)v"(r~ +R ~) 
+ o h ~ v ' V ' ( T ~  h + R h) 
de  h V ' ( T  hh + R h) 
dR a = A 
drear a = {+,.~,avav. + O%~aV[avv " v  - av'v'] 
+ aVaV'0h (0h~ h" - 20h":)} { a) - '  > 0, 
< 0 ,  
where the last sign results from Assumptions 2 and 3. 
Once the responses in the second period have been determined, the problem in 
period one can be written as 
m a x Z =  { OL( el)[  bx L + OL( eL )bx2 + Oh( eL ) (  bx h -  TLh)] 
+ 0h(ex) [bx  h -- T h _ R h + O L ( g ( R h ) ) b x  L 
+ O h ( g ( R h ) ) ( b x ~ - - f ( R h ) ] }  
+ AI{0h'( e l ) [V(Tx  h) +/3AEU~2(Rh)]  - 1} 
+ 0 L ( e , )  hL{0h'(e L ) V ( T ~ )  -- 1} 
+ 0h (e l )  A~{ 0h'( g ( R  h ) ) [ V ( f ( R  a) + R h) - V(Ra)]  - 1}, 
with respect to e l, T, R h and A 1, where 
AEU22(R h) = ~ L ( g ( g h ) ) v ( R h )  + O h ( g ( R h ) ) v ( f ( R  h) + R  h) 
- 0 h ( e L ) V ( T ~  ) - ( e h - e L ) />  0.  
Thus, differentiation with respect to el, T1 h, R h and A 1 results in 
el :  O~'(eO{[b(x~-xt)-r?-R h] + (EU#2- EUp~)} 
+ a~0h"(m)[V(T() +/3AEU22(Rh)] =0. 
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T~: - e b b ( e l )  + Alc~h'( e l ) V ' ( T  h)  = O, 
Rh: _ ~ h (  el)[  1 _ ~h'( e h )[ b( x h - x L ) - T2 hh ] g '(  R h) + 4,h( e2 h ) f (  R~)] 
+ A 1 [34,h' (e l )  { 4,L(e h)V'( R h) + ~bh( e2 h)V' (T~ + R h) 
+4,h(eh)V'(T~ h + Rh)]"(Rh)} + Ah 4,h(el) 
× {gph'(e~)[V'(T~ + Rh) - V'(Rh)] + qbh'(e~)V'(T~ h + R h) 
× f ' (  R h) + ekh"(e~)[V(T2 hh + R h) -- V( Rh)] g '(  Rh)} = 0, 
AI: ¢kh'(e,)[V(T1 h) + ¢3AEU22(Rh)] - 1 = 0 ,  
where {[b(x~ - x ~ )  - T~ - R  h ] + (EUvh2 - EuL)} is assumed to be strictly posi- 
tive (i.e., the principal prefers a high outcome even net of transfers). 
A.2. Equilibrium in period two with two principals: Aligned interests 
Totally differentiating Eqs. (7), (8) and (9), and after replacing [b(x  h - x  L) - 
TL~] and [a(x  h --xL) - Ts2 hh] from the L~ and Sh's first-order conditions we 
obtain the following system: 
[ 0 h( 1 
_ q~h'+ - - ~  2 de~ + [ ~ A----V + V ' ' - -7 -  J dTt~ ~ hn2  
[ v, 
+ 6h _ dr~h = dR. ,  
a-¢ v '  ] 4, h -~aw'  
I. [ 0 h( 0 hn)] 
- 4, h' + ~ 2 4y~ de~ - ~h V' ~ d r ~  
~h'2v' ~hv '  ~hv" ] AV'V' - AW" 
+ 4 , ~ v  a - - V - + - - - ~  d r ~ - -  4 , ~ _ ~ W  , dR ~, 
J 
d ~ g  de~ + d~h'g ' d T ~ +  4~h'g ' dT~ = - 4 ~ V '  dR  h, 
where zW -- [ v ( r ~  + r~ ~ + R h) - v(R~)I > o, a v '  = [ v ' ( r ~  + r~ ~ + R h) - 
V'(Rh)] < O, and V' = V ' ( T ~  + T~ h + Rh). Noting that the first term on the 
right-hand side of the f'trst two equations is negative from Assumptions 1 and 2, it 
is easy to check that the determinant is negative. Also, ~eh/OR h < 0 and aTL~/OR h 
= a T ~ / a R  h > 0 follow immediately. 
Finally, the long lived principal's problem in period one can be written as 
max Z = {4,L(el) [ bx L + 4,L(e L)bx~ + ~bh( e L )(bxh2 -- TL~)] 
+ ~bh( el)[  bx h -- Thl -- R h + 4,L( e h)bx L 
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+dph(eh)(bxh--f(Rh)]} 
+ ALI{~bh'(e,)[v(Thl + Ts h) + [3AEUh2(Rh)] - 1} 
+ ekL(em)AL2{ckh'(eL)[v(TLh + T~L2h)] -- 1} + ~bh(el)AhL2 
X {dph'(e~)[V(f(R h) + h(R h) + R  h) -- V(Rh)] - 1}, 
with respect to e 1, Tht, R h and ALl. Differentiation with respect to e,, Thl, R h 
and ALl results in 
el: (~h' ( el){ [ b( Xl h - x L) - r l  h - R h ] + (EUh2 -- EuL2 )} 
+ ALI~bh"(el)[V(T h, + Tshl)+ flAEUh2(Rh)] = 0 ,  
rLhl: --~bh(el) + ALlC~h'(el)V'(ThA + T~h)=o, 
X {~bL(eh)V'( R h) + dph(eh)V'(TLhh2 + Ts~ h + R h) 
+ckh(eh)V'(T~ + T~2 + Rh)(f'(R h) + h'(Rh))} 
+ Ah24)h(e,)ckh'{(eh)[v'(T hh + T~ hh +R h) 
,' hh Tshh+Rh)(f,(Rh)+l~(Rh))}=O, -V'(Rh)] + V (T~2 + 
ALI:•h' ( el)[ V(Thl + Tshl) + flAEU22(Rh)] - 1 - -0 .  
Replacing ALl and Ah2 from L's first-order conditions in the first and second 
periods respectively, the first-order condition with respect to R h becomes 
V,(Thh + Ts hh + R h ) 
(#h( el ) _ 1 +/34,h(e h) , h 
V(T~I+T~ h) 
V'(Rh) ( V'(Rh) )]  
+ [3,bL(eh) v,(--T-~L,+Th) +c~h(eh2) 1-- V,(Th~2+~h~ +Rh) 
+ v'(r  + r2 + Rh) 
V'(T?, + + 
+ ~bh( el)' ~bh(e h)h'( R h) = 0. 
A.3. Equilibrium in period two with two principals: Opposed interests. 53 
Totally differentiating Eqs. (10), (11) and (12), and after replacing [b(xh2 --x L) 
- - T ~ ]  and [a(x L - x 2  h) -T~2 hE ] from L h and S2h's first-order conditions respec- 
ss We consider a utility function with constant absolute risk-aversion for computational simplicity. 
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tively we obtain the system below: 
-- f~h' + ~h 1 (~h"2 deh + ~h~v ~h'2 1 
+ ~ h  V"(T~+R)  4~hV'(T~+R) dTs~ L= 
, h R) dTLh~+ 0, v (TL2 + ,av 
[ ~bL~bh" ( th~,bh"' ) ] d~Lv'(T~hL+R) dTh h 
2  ,r2 de - aV 
~h'2v'(TshL + R) [ q~Lc~h~(V"(Tsh2L+R) AV )]} 
+ ~ V  1 + - 7  --V"/'rhCl,.s2 + R) 2 + 1 dT~ hc = O, 
h' , h R)drLh2 - h' , hL IlL ~b~Vde~ + qb V (r~, 2 + th V (Ts2 + R)dTs2 - qb~V'dR. 
Note that Assumptions 1 and 2 assure that the first term of the first (second) 
equation above is negative (positive), whereas the third term of the second 
equation is negative by Assumption 1 even if V" -- 0. Then, it is easy to check 
that the determinant is negative. It is also straightforward to show that i)eh2/OR h 
and aT~L/aR ~ are negative. Finally, OT~/OR h is positive if and only if 
4,h,V,(r,2 + R) [ 612] 
av 4'c + 4, " J 
X [ ~  h' ~h~h"(  2 - - ~ h '  
~LV"(Ts2 + R )  
+ 
v'(r~2 + R )  
)] I °,h ] ~b"'~ h~2 + dphdph'lV,(T~2AV + R) [ ~ 1 <0. 
Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that the first two terms are negative and the last one 
is positive. Consider the two extreme cases. 
(a) ~b~bh"/~b h"2 = 1. Then OT~/~R h is unambiguously positive. 
(b) ~b~h"/ff h'2 2. Then, since " hL = V (T~2 + R)AV = V'(Ts hL + R)AV' because we 
are considering a utility function with constant risk-aversion, ~T~/aRhl > 0 if and 
only if 
~,h'v'(T~hL+R)[ V'(Th~ + R) 4~ ~ ] 
d V  ~6L ~h < 0. V'(T~ hL + R) + + 4)h" J 
t hL Since V'(TI. ~ + R) < V (T~2 + R), a sufficient condition for OT~/OR h > 0 is 
that [1 + tkh'2/~b h" ] ~< 0. We assume that this is the case. 54 
s4 If ~bh(e) = 2 -- e -1 (and e E (1/2,1)) for instance, the condition is only satisfied for low ~bh(e), 
with the range increasing as the utility function becomes more risk-averse. 
a s  
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Lastly, the long lived principal's problem in period one can then be written 
55 
Lh max Z =  {oL( el)[  bx~ + 4~L(e~)bx~ + ~bh( e~ )( bx~ - T~2 )] 
+ ~bh( ea)[ bx h - T~I ~ R h + ~bL(e h )bx~ 
+ A'LI{$h'(el)[V(ThL1) - V(Ts L) + / 3 a E U 2 2 ( R " ) ]  - 1} 
+ ~bL(el) At'2{~bh'(e~ )[ V(T~ h) - V(T~L)] - 1} + ~bh(el) A[2 
X{ckh ' (e~)[V( f (R h) + Rh) - V ( h ( R  h) + R~)] - 1}, 
with respect to ea, T, h R h and A', where LI~ LI~ 
AEUh2(R h) = + L ( e h ) V ( h ( R  h) + R h)  + ~bh(eh)V(f(Rh) + R h) 
h L Lh --4~L(e~)V(T~L2L)--4~ (e2)V(T:.2)-(eh-e~)>~O. 
Thus, differentiation with respect to ea, T~a, R h and A' 1 results in 
e:  4 , ' ( eO{ [b (x~-x t )  - r~-I~ ~] + (EU¢~- EU~)} 
A~ c~h"t e "[VET hh'~ - ~3AEU2z(Rh)] + ~, , ~, t  ~ ~,J v ( ~ )  + 
A', a'h'te aV' tT  ~ ~ rh,: - -~bh(e,)+ r,'~" ,, ,,' ~ L,J, 
I h' L h t hL Rh: --~h(el)[1 +~r~(e~)f'(Rh)] + )tLafl~b (e~){~b (ez)V (Ts2 +R h) 
h h t hh + ~b ( e z )V  (T~.2 + R ~) + 6"(e~)V'(r~ + n " ) f ' ( ~ h )  
L h ~ hL h h h' h h' h t hh h +~ (e~)V (r~ +n )U(R ) } + ~  ~e~)~ (ee)[V (T~2+n)  
- v'(r?~ + ~ ) ]  + v ' ( r~  + t e ) : ' ( ~ )  - v ( r ~  + n~)u(~h)}, 
a l l  :(~h'( e~)[ V(T~, ) -- V(T~ ) + ¢~AEU22(Rh)] - 1 = 0. 
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